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FQPA Implementation to Reduce Pesticide Residue Risks:
Part I: Agricultural Producer Concerns
Executive Summary
The Food Quality Protection Act: Implementation challenge
The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA) transforms the regulation of pesticide
residues on food in the United States.  Three changes are prominent.  First, the Act replaces a
two-tiered system which prohibited the presence of any carcinogenic pesticide residues in
processed foods but tolerated the same residues on fresh-market foods.  Under the FQPA, the
U.S.  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to develop uniform pesticide residue
tolerances for both fresh and processed foods.  These tolerances must be based on a conservative
standard appropriate for infants and children, rather than the adult-based tolerances that prevailed
previously for fresh-market produce.  Second, the previous system of pesticide registration was
based upon risk associated with specific uses of each compound. Under the FQPA, pesticide
registration will be based upon aggregate risk to the most susceptible consumers from all
pesticides sharing a common biochemical mode of action in humans.  Third, the previous system
based all risk assessment decisions on a chemical’s potential to cause cancers in animals or
humans.  The FQPA expands the scope of health effects included in risk assessment decisions to
include potential endocrine and reproductive effects of pesticidal chemicals.
As the EPA has moved to develop implementation guidelines for the FQPA, agricultural
producers and input suppliers have become particularly concerned about the impact of the
aggregate risk standards on regulatory decision making.  These standards are sometimes referred
to by analogy as a “risk cup” whose limited capacity can be filled with certain pesticide uses to thev
point where there remains no room for other uses.  Particular concerns have centered on whether
a small risk cup, combined with conservative risk assessments, might cause whole families of
pesticides to become unavailable, especially to producers of minor crops.   Supporters of the
FQPA counter that loss of whole groups of pesticides is not a likely outcome.  
Agricultural producer concerns
Even if the FQPA’s implementation results only in a restriction of the pesticides used on
some crops producers still have four major concerns.  The foremost concern is about the potential
loss of farm profitability, especially for farms specializing in fruit and vegetable production. 
Specifically, producers point to economic impact studies which predict crop yield losses and the
need to switch to more costly pest control methods which could undermine farm profits. 
Michigan fruit and vegetable producers are a case in point.  Unfortunately, the validity of most
impact studies is seriously limited by their assumptions.  History suggests that the actual impacts
of known pesticide cancellations have tended to be less than predicted.  As a practical matter, the
magnitude and incidence of the FQPA impacts will depend on how the Act is implemented.  Given
the FQPA’s mandate to minimize health risks without regard to the foregone benefits of pesticide
use, the most pressing policy research need is to examine alternative means for implementing this
mandate rather than more impact studies.
The impact on farm profitability of the FQPA will depend on its implementation details. 
In general, the more major the changes needed to be made in existing farming practices and the
shorter period of time to make the adjustments, the higher the potential impacts on farmer
profitability.  Furthermore, as more producers move to a reduced chemical system of production,
the more they will need to acquire new knowledge and management skills.vi
The loss of various uses of pesticides will have uneven impacts across the country.  In
Michigan, for example, the apple maggot is controlled by azinophos-methyl (Guthion), an
organophosphate for which there do not appear to be effective, profitable substitutes.  Eastern
Washington apple growers, on the other hand, do not have to contend with the apple maggot as a
pest.  
The second major concern of the agricultural community is that the FQPA implementation
could result in unfair competition if foreign competitors can use pesticides forbidden to domestic
producers.  This issue is complex.  While residue standards enforced at the border are current
policy, little imported produce is actually tested.  At the same time, because some fresh produce
arrives when little domestic output is on the market, some imports do not directly compete with
U.S. production.  And because pests vary among regions, the same crop produced abroad may
not need the same pesticides required in the United States.
The trade impacts of the FQPA, therefore, are not easily determined and are dependent on
the way that the FQPA is implemented.  Any definitive research to resolve this issue would
require comprehensive data bases on chemical uses by crop across countries.  It does appear that
some fresh product imports which compete directly with domestic products–such as Michigan
potatoes competing with Canadian potatoes–could be negatively impacted if the FQPA conferred
a production cost advantage to Canadian imports.  If the FQPA uses strict residue standards by
crop, regardless of country of origin, however, and if such standards are strictly enforced, there
should be no competitive disadvantages posed to U.S. products by the FQPA since all production
would be required to meet the same standards.  The adequacy of import inspections becomes a
key policy concern then, for an FQPA strategy that relies on residue standards.  Also, there willvii
still be situations where other countries’ grades and standards which require use of certain
pesticides on imports might need to be renegotiated to assure market access for U.S. products.
The third area of producers’ concern is the impact of the FQPA on consumer purchases. 
If reduced pesticide use results in more blemishes or lower quality product, will consumers refuse
to purchase the product?  Many consumers are willing to pay more for reduced pesticide use, but
price and other product quality attributes are important.  Some studies suggest that there is
consumer resistance to price increases above 10 percent.  Consumer preferences are dynamic and
could easily change with more information, however.  Even though there is a growing and
profitable markets for pesticide-free foods, and there are many case studies of profitable farm
enterprises with organic or low pesticide practices, such markets for these products represent only
about two percent of sales.  And, while the food system is evolving to provide attributes that
consumers desire, and lower pesticide risk is clearly one such attribute, there is a lack of research
to undergird pursuit of these markets by large numbers of producers.  We know little about: 1)
those final product attributes for which the consumers are willing to pay, including specifically 2)
whether they are really willing to pay more for products, perhaps imperfect, produced with lower
pesticide use.  Such consumer research should be conducted and should also address the impact
of public education on consumer preferences.  Indeed, as food production increasingly is
consumer-focused, understanding consumer demands and then communicating those demands
from the table all the way to the farmer and farm input suppliers, will become crucial for business
success.
The fourth major concern of producers is that reduced availability of pesticides may
translate into excessive reliance on a few remaining pest control weapons, resulting in acceleratedviii
development of genetic pest resistance.  This vicious cycle of fewer pest control options hastening
the reduced effectiveness of those pest controls that remain can be broken by 1) undertaking
considerably more research into non-pesticide methods of pest control, 2) implementing the
FQPA in a manner that does not prohibit all uses of broad classes of pesticides, or 3) developing
new classes of pesticides that are lower risk.
Implications
There are many uncertainties with respect to the impacts related to alternative FQPA
implementation strategies.  Because these uncertainties potentially impact producers’ livelihoods,
many argue for a go-slow, long transition for any major changes in the way they farm or the pest
control products they use.
Competing with these agricultural concerns, however, are a parallel set of concerns,
expressed by consumer and environmental groups, that the FQPA’s promise to protect infants and
children from pesticide risks will be sabotaged by lax implementation.  Research as to how much,
if any, of these problems relate to agricultural’s use of pesticides is fragmentary and inconclusive. 
Nevertheless, the existing evidence is such that many experts, including a National Academy of
Sciences panel, have advocated that the United States adopt a conservative approach to protect
sensitive sub-populations from cumulative exposures.
Learning from producer concerns and moving ahead with the FQPA implementation
The common element that emerges from this review of producer concerns reviewed is:
Impacts on producers will depend on how the FQPA is implemented.  Having established a ban on
the use of broad categories of pesticides would be economically damaging, little value will be
gained from additional research measuring just how damaging those impacts would be.  Theix
current imperative is how to implement the Act in a way that meets its food safety mandate while
minimizing the likely adjustment costs to producers.  In “Part II: FQPA Implementation
Alternatives and Strategies,” the authors assess alternative ways to establish pesticide use
priorities and to complete the transition to agricultural production that meets FQPA standards.1
FQPA Implementation to Reduce Pesticide Residue Risks:
Part I: Agricultural Producer Concerns
The Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) is comprehensive legislation intended to protect 
human health from the hazards of pesticides in our food supply.  Because the FQPA represents a
major break from the established methods of managing pesticide risk, farmers, agribusinesses,
environmentalists, policymakers, and consumers all have concerns about the implementation of
the FQPA.  This paper reviews the legislative history of FQPA and examines in detail the
concerns of agricultural producers for how the Act might be implemented.  In a following paper,
“Part II: FQPA Implementation Alternatives and Strategies,” the authors examine strategies for
accommodating producers’ concerns while meeting the legislative mandate of FQPA to protect
the U.S. food supply from pesticide risks. 
What Is FQPA?
The FQPA changed the manner in which pesticide risks are to be managed in the United
States.  In particular, the FQPA replaces the “zero cancer-risk” standard for pesticide residues in
processed food contained in the Delaney Clause with a single health based standard for both raw
and processed foods.  The new standard requires that pesticide tolerances are set to assure with “a
reasonable certainty, that no harm will result from aggregate exposure” to the pesticide.  If there
is insufficient data to establish the levels at which there is “reasonable certainty that no harm” will
occur to infants, children, and other sensitive individuals, an additional tenfold safety margin is to
be added.  One reason for the addition of this safety factor is that pesticides may be harmful to the
nervous system and reproductive organs–particularly of infants, toddlers and small children. 
Besides being smaller than adults, children’s bodies are still developing, and they tend to1While occupational exposure to farm workers is not included in the FQPA, there is
currently a petition to the EPA administrator to include farm children as a major subgroup to be
included within the FQPA (Natural Resources Defense Council, United Farm Workers of
America, Farm Workers Justice Fund, American Public Health Association Petition, 1999;
http://www.ecologic-ipm.com/farmkids.PDF).
2
consume–proportionally–many more fruits and vegetables than the average adult (Kuchler,
Ralston, Unnevehr, and Chandran, 1996).
Because of these concerns, the FQPA requires that the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) treat those pesticides which have a common toxic mechanism as a single hazard,
and obligates EPA to consider dietary and non-dietary exposures in an aggregated manner.  Thus,
attention is focused on exposures stemming from food consumption, drinking water, and
residential uses.
1  The Act requires that EPA review all existing tolerances to ensure that they
meet the new safety standard by the year 2006.  The Act directs EPA to focus first on pesticide
uses posing greatest health risks, bringing those tolerances into compliance with the new safety
standard of the Act.  This last requirement is sometimes referred to as the “worst first” criterion.
FQPA represents a major break with previous pesticide policy–as found in the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 (FIFRA)--which gave considerable weight to
the benefits of pesticide use (Cropper and Oates, 1992).  The FQPA applies a “precautionary
principle” to pesticide risks.  The “precautionary principle” is firmly embedded in European
environmental policy and requires that regulatory action be taken before uncertainty about
possible environmental or health damages is resolved (Hanley, Shogren, and White, 1997).  For
food safety, this principle rejects the assertion that absence of evidence of harm necessarily
equates with safe food (Wargo, 1996). Thus, the FQPA strictly limits the nature and influence of
benefits considered in establishing pesticide tolerances.  Regulators are to consider only health2The EPA, under FQPA can consider pesticide benefits only if either (a) “the pesticide
protects consumers against adverse health impacts that are greater than the health risks posed by
the pesticide itself” or (b) “the pesticide is needed to prevent a ‘significant disruption in [the]
domestic production of an adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply.’”
3The proverbial version of the “precautionary principle” is “better to be safe than sorry.” 
Accompanying food safety risks, however, is the possibility of taking costly preventive actions
that ultimately are found to be unwarranted.  Both types of risks impose potential social
costs–albeit on different stakeholders. Economic theory provides a less demanding principle–that
of the “safe minimum standard.” The safe minimum standard also demands protection of human
health and environmental quality before uncertainty about impacts are resolved.  However, it
includes a caveat–action should be taken unless the societal costs (e.g., the lost benefits from
withdrawn pesticide uses) of so doing are deemed unacceptably high.  What is unacceptably high
is a social decision, not a scientific one.
3
risks and benefits that accrue to consumers (Schierow, 1998).  That is, a policy of the
minimization of risk to human health replaces the previous test of balancing costs and benefits
(including producer benefits) of chemical uses.
2
The rationale for this “precautionary principle” approach is that researchers cannot
accurately predict the social costs of new pesticides; that is, they cannot predict whether new
pesticide will ultimately cause health problems.  Advocates of the precautionary principle point to
a history of chemical uses that, while initially thought safe, ultimately proved to have negative
health impacts (Wargo, 1996).
3
Legislative History
The FQPA was passed with the support of many farm organizations, consumer groups and
environmentalists, in part because it eliminated the distinction between raw and processed food
tolerances.  When passed in 1958, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA)
prohibited the establishment of any processed-food tolerances for food additives classified as
oncogenic (capable of inducing tumors) in animals or humans regardless of whether the additive4The FQPA did not repeal FFDCA Section 409, which contains the Delaney Clause. 
Section 409 remains in effect for food additives in processed foods that are not pesticide residues. 
(Schierow, 1998).
4
was deemed to be a health hazard (National Research Council, 1987).  This provision of FFDCA,
called the Delaney Clause, meant that no residue was allowed in any processed product if the
responsible chemical had ever produced tumors in test animals.  With advances in chemical
toxicology over the succeeding decades, it became possible to detect infinitesimal levels of
oncogenic compounds that would have passed undetected during the 1950's.  As a result, the
Delaney Clause “zero-risk” standard came to be viewed as extreme by many.
To further complicated the issue, pesticide residues found on fresh or raw foods (but not
processed foods) were regulated under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA).  Under FIFRA Section 408, pesticide registrations were established by balancing the 
benefits and costs from using the chemicals.  The inherent contradiction between the pesticide
usage provisions of FFDCA and FIFRA was a source of frustration to many in the agricultural
industry and led, in part, to their support of FQPA. 
In discussions leading to passage of FQPA, environmentalists and consumer advocacy
groups were willing to eliminate the Delaney “zero-risk” provision in processed foods 
4 in
exchange for (1) an elimination of criteria which called for the balancing of benefits and costs of
pesticide use on fresh foods, (2) shifting from a focus on individual pesticide uses to a focus on
aggregate exposure from all pesticides sharing a common biochemical mode of action in humans,
(3) introduction of more conservative thresholds to reflect risks based on children’s diets, and (4)
broadening the health risk criteria beyond cancer to include the possible risk of endocrine-related
reproduction damage and neurological damages.  These last two concerns gained visibility5The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency classifies carcinogens into five groups, A - E. 
A substance in group B1 or B2 is a Probable Human Carcinogen.
5
following the release of a 1993 National Academy of Science study on pesticides in children’s
diets (National Research Council, 1993) and a book entitled Our Stolen Future which promoted
the hypothesis that chemicals, including pesticides, could cause birth defects and fertility problems
in humans and other animals (Colborn et al., 1996).
The implementation of FQPA has focused initially on those families of pesticides deemed
to pose the greatest threats to human health.  The first groups of chemicals being examined are
the organophosphate and carbamate insecticides, which are nerve poisons, plus those fungicides
classified by EPA as B2 carcinogens.
5  These groups of chemicals are currently used on many
crops.
The diverse nature of the many stakeholders and their interests complicate the
implementation of FQPA.  Relations among many of the stakeholders are marked by distrust and
suspicion about underlying motivations and values.  Moreover, most agricultural stakeholders
tend to originate from a history and culture that emphasizes protection of agricultural profitability,
voluntary and community-based programs, and public subsidies to obtain public goals.  By
contrast, many other stakeholders come from a culture that emphasizes public safety and the
pursuit of public goals through more regulatory, top-down programs accompanied by fines and
penalties as incentives to obtain public goals (Batie, 1987).  Given the many and differing
perspectives on these fundamental issues, it is of little surprise that the implementation of the
FQPA is exceptionally controversial.6In late April 1999, a bill was introduced by Representative Pombo in the House of
Representatives (HR 1592, “Regulatory Fairness and Openness Act of 1999") that addresses
some producers’ concerns.   The bill would postpone tolerance setting until there is more data,
require comprehensive transition analyses before implementation of tolerances, and monitor the
competitive strength of major U.S. agricultural commodity sectors in the international market
place.  If it passes as written, the bill will substantially delay implementation of FQPA. HR 1592
provisions would change the FQPA mandate of minimizing human health risks from pesticide use
6
The FQPA Implementation Planning Process
While initially supportive of FQPA, many producers are now concerned about how the
Act will be implemented.  Producers have protested that there are potential negative impacts on
their livelihoods if many of the uses of these chemicals were to be banned or their use were to be
seriously curtailed.  In response to these concerns, Vice President Gore called for the
establishment of an advisory committee, and in May 1998, the joint EPA-USDA Tolerance
Reassessment Advisory Committee (TRAC) was established to try to obtain the smooth
implementation of the FQPA.  The TRAC is charged with providing policy guidance on sound
science, ways to increase transparency in decision making, and strategies for a reasonable
transition for agriculture.
The TRAC process has been contentious.  By May, 1999, eight environmental and
consumer organizations, including the Environmental Working Group, World Wildlife Fund,
Natural Resource Defense Council, the Consumers Union, had resigned from the TRAC,
protesting that the process consumes too much EPA staff time and serves as a political tool of the
FQPA opponents to delay implementation of FQPA.  The TRAC supporters counter that TRAC
has forced the EPA to be more open about their decision processes and has forced rationalization 
of its decisions to others.  Despite the TRAC process, producers’ concerns with respect to the
implementation of FQPA remain.
6to prohibiting the cancellation or modification of a tolerance base on uncertain data.
7Cumulative assessments combine exposures to two or more chemicals that share a
common mechanism.
8Aggregate assessments account for multiple sources and routes of exposure for a single
chemical.  For a good overview of this estimation procedure see EPA Staff Paper #25 (September
14, 1998), “EPA’s Assessment Process for Tolerance Reassessment.”
7
Key Implementation Issues
Most of the key implementation issues of the FQPA revolve around EPA’s answer to
three major questions:
(1) What is the maximum allowable exposure to particular chemical-family for an
individual consumers?
(2) How do current uses, including both domestic and imported agricultural uses,
contribute to that exposure?, and
(3) How does the EPA allocate the maximum allowable exposure per individual among
competing uses?
The EPA has had to develop, in a very short time, procedures and processes for answering
these questions.  Despite the enormous difficulties associated with this task, the EPA has been
making significant progress in refining and answering many significant science policy issues,
particularly with respect to the first two questions. 
The first of the three major questions addresses exposure to risks.  Under the FQPA,
exposure (defined as the estimate of the human population at risk from cumulative
7 exposure to a
particular chemical family) is based on an aggregate
8 of all possible sources.  These sources are
not only dietary exposure from both domestic and imported foods, but also drinking water and8
non-food sources in the air, households, schools, lawns, and gardens.  The total exposure for an
individual permitted under the FQPA has been termed “the risk cup.”  The “risk cup” is a
pesticide-exposure performance standard for chemicals sharing a common mechanism based on an
individual’s exposure stemming from all food and non-food sources. 
The second major question requires an estimation of the contribution of various pesticide
uses to individual exposure – a complex task.  Estimates of dietary risks from pesticide residues
require adequate information on (1) the combined acute and chronic toxicity of the pesticide and
(2) the cumulative, aggregate exposure to pesticide residues on food.  The latter, requires (3)
information on pesticide use patterns over time, and (4) consumption patterns by age, sex,
ethnicity, and location (Archibald and Winter, 1989).  The science and data collection underlying
such estimates is evolving and incomplete, and there are many sources of uncertainty (Wargo,
1996).  Scientists compensate for this uncertainty with estimates of use patterns and cumulative
exposures based on established, but frequently controversial, protocols and estimation
procedures.
Once there has been a cumulative and aggregate assessment of risks from pesticide uses,
the size of the “risk cup” that can be allowed for a class of chemicals is determined.  The size of
the risk cup equates with the legislative requirement that there is a “reasonable certainty that no
harm” will occur to infants, children and other sensitive individuals.  
The next challenge, then is the third question--how to prioritize those uses in each “risk
cup.” That is, within the acceptable exposure risk to a particular class of chemicals, which
potential uses are to be allowed within the cup and which are to be excluded?  Addressing this9
thorny problem is a challenge and a great concern to chemical registrants, retailers, agricultural
producers and other chemical users.
Potential Impacts of the FQPA: Producer Concerns
The concerns of many stakeholders associated with agriculture about the implementation
of the FQPA can be characterized as fear that (1) the risk cup will be too small, (2) the
calculations of the current contributions of agricultural and other uses of pesticides to the risk cup
will be too large and (3) that important domestic agricultural uses will not have priority in the final
allocation of pesticide uses.
Many producers are concerned that, just as there are potential risks from implementing the 
FQPA too slowly and not adequately protecting human health, there are also potential risks of
proceeding too rapidly and/or with “too small” a risk cup or too conservative an allocation of
uses.  Many fear that the science underlying the calculation of various pesticide uses relies too
heavily on overly conservative usage estimates rather than actual use data (Implementation
Working Group, 1998).  If this is true, the translation of uses into exposures and therefore into
tolerances will be overly conservative.  They fear that multiple conservative safety factors in the
calculation of contributions to the risk cup will impose costs on agricultural producers that are
disproportionate to the safety benefits garnered.  Furthermore, they are frustrated that, within
FQPA, these costs cannot be counted unless they impact human health.  In addition, they fear that
non-agricultural uses such as home lawn care or pet care will take precedence over agricultural
uses.
Many producers worry that too small a risk cup could have unforeseen and unintended
consequences on their livelihoods.  They are also concerned that they will be forced into making10
investments or transitioning into new systems of production or processing that either will be too
expensive or ineffective in achieving the twin goals of profitability and exposure safety.  They
worry as well that the FQPA may become a constraint that is tightened over time; that is, they
may be subject to further regulatory requirements without the necessary research investments to
provide the technological alternatives they need to make profitable transitions to reduced chemical
use.  There is also the concern that foreign producers might obtain an enduring competitive
advantage over domestic producers if the FQPA imposes stricter regulations on domestic
production practices than those faced by foreign producers.  In addition, producers fear consumer
rejection of fruits and vegetables if FQPA limits pesticides that provide improved quality
attributes–such as absence of blemishes.  Finally, they worry that fewer available chemicals may
translate into accelerated genetic resistance of pest to those pesticides that remain available under
the FQPA.  
For many of these concerns, research is fragmentary and, while suggestive, certainly not
conclusive.  Actual impacts, and thus the validity of producer concerns, will depend on how the
FQPA is implemented.  Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to examine these concerns in greater detail,
to catalog the pertinent research available, to assess what future research needs exist, and to
explore implications for the implementation of the FQPA.
Farm Profitability
The first producer concern surrounding the implementation of the FQPA is farm
profitability. This issue is defined in the context of producers’ concerns.  The state of knowledge
surrounding these concerns is presented.  Finally, implications of the FQPA for farm profitability
are summarized.9This “at risk” determination was assigned by the authors based on whether an
organophosphate and/or carbamate pesticide used on a Michigan grown crop has been identified
as being potentially affected by the FQPA in one or more of the following sources: U.S.
11
Defining the Issue: Farm Profitability Concerns
Most of producers’ concerns with the FQPA understandably revolve around impacts on
sector profitability and viability.  These economic impacts manifest themselves through direct
profitability changes or indirectly through limited choice of alternatives, through import
competition, changes in consumer behavior, and pest resistance accompanied by loss of pesticide-
based technologies. 
Producers are concerned that the FQPA implementation will directly and significantly
impact their profitability if the FQPA removes pesticides from the producers’ choice set.  At least
for the first phase of the FQPA, the main producer concern is for the profitability of fruits and
vegetables, which have fewer substitute pesticides and higher residues than other crops.  The
potential impact of the FQPA on the welfare of fruit and vegetable producers becomes more
severe as (1) the risk cup becomes smaller, (2) the contributions of fruit and vegetable chemical
use to the risk cup become larger, and (3)“minor crop” pesticide uses are given less protection.
Fruit and vegetable producers in the state of Michigan are a case in point.  As illustrated
by Table 1, Michigan producers use a large number of  “high-profile” organophosphate and
carbamate insecticides. Their location in a humid region makes insect and plant disease attacks
endemic.  For example, Michigan growers, which produce 45 million dollars of fresh apples and
55 million of processed products per year currently use eleven organophosphates or carbamates
pesticides that are “at risk” in the FQPA process. “At risk” pesticides are those most likely to be
impacted by the FQPA.
9  One organophosphate of particular concern to Michigan growers isEnvironmental Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs,  Organophosphate Use and
Usage Information (http://www.epa.gov/oppbead1/matrices); Consumers Union 1998 study
“Worst First: High-Risk Insecticide Uses, Children’s Foods and Safer Alternatives; Consumers
Union 1999 study “Do You Know What You’re Eating? An Analysis Of U.S. Government Data
On Pesticide Residues In Foods”; Michigan State University Pesticide Loss Prediction Database
(http://www.cips.msu.edu/par). 
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azinphos-methyl, (Guthion), which is viewed by producers as essential for control of the apple
maggot. According to National Agricultural Statistics Service, 83 percent of Michigan apple acres
are treated with azinphos-methyl three to four times a season.
Appendix A lists “at risk” chemicals by various Michigan fruit and vegetable crops and by
chemical trade name.  The reliance on many of these pesticides by Michigan producers means they
are concerned about whether affordable, effective alternatives can be substituted if these “at risk”
pesticides are lost (Whalon et al., 1999).
Although most producers recognize the need to meet consumer demands for enhanced
food safety, many are worried about consequences if whole classes of pesticides become
unavailable.  If whole classes of pesticides were banned, short-term producer profitability risks
could loom large (Whalon et al., 1999).  To begin with, the most convenient substitutes for
compounds that are banned tend to be close chemical relatives.  Previous studies have shown that
producer profitability suffers more from losing whole families of related compounds than from
losing access to individual compounds when similar substitutes remain (e.g., Swinton et al. 1995). 
However, it is doubtful that whole classes of pesticides are actually at risk with the
implementation of the FQPA.  While some agricultural publications have asserted that a complete
cancellation of two classes of pesticides--organophosphates and carbamates--is planned as part of
the implementation of the FQPA; the EPA has labeled such rumors as “scare tactics” and assure10Profitability impacts from restricting the use of pesticides would be expected to be most
severe where pest pressure is greatest.  In the United States, the climate of the humid East tends
to favor pest insects and diseases more than the arid West, making pesticide bans potentially more
damaging to grower profitability in the Eastern states.  For example, the apple maggot is a severe
problem in Michigan orchards, but they are not a pest in Eastern Washington orchards (Gut,
Personal Communication, 1999).
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critics that complete chemical class bans will not be forthcoming.  The EPA also has indicated that
rather than bans per se, they may require very low or even zero residues on products for
particular chemicals for particular crops.  Because residue requirements focus on a residue
outcome rather than on the use of an input, they would leave growers the option of how to use
restricted chemicals so long as the result met the residue standards.  For example, in some cases,
producers could use a chemical but leave a long enough post harvest interval so that residue
standards would be met.  It is possible that EPA might also allow some mitigation of pesticide
residues on the crop at harvest via processing, that is, washing, peeling, or cooking the crop may
reduce residues to acceptable levels.
Another producer concern is that, in certain small acreage fruit and vegetable crops, there
may be few registered pesticide substitutes to begin with, simply because manufacturers found the
pesticide market for those crops to be too small to warrant the investment in toxicology testing
required in order to obtain registration with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
For these “minor use crops,” which include virtually all fruits and vegetables grown in the United
States, the lack of substitute pesticides is largely responsible for the dramatic decline in
profitability found in studies that have attempted to predict short-term impacts of complete
pesticide bans
10 (Swinton and Scorsone 1997; Knutson et al. 1993).  Because the residues found14
on these products are high while the profitability of these uses to chemical suppliers may be low,
producers are concerned that minor crop uses will be omitted in the final allocation. 
Another producer concern involves new technology products.  Severe restrictions of
various pesticide chemistries may imperil future technological innovations that depend upon the
availability of those pesticides.  Examples include low-rate sprayers, bait traps, and other
innovations that may sharply reduce pesticide residue risks, but that rely nonetheless on the
availability of pesticides.  The validity of this concern depends on whether the EPA regulates with
reduced residue requirements or with bans.  A residue performance standard would impact fewer
technologies than a categorical ban.
State of Knowledge: Farm Profitability
There have been both profitability impact studies of reduced pesticide use as well as
studies addressing the problems of transition from conventional to lower chemical pest
management systems.
Impact Studies of Reductions in Pesticide Use
There have been many impact studies of varying quality during the past decade of both the
economic benefits provided by pesticides and the impacts of their removal (see Textbox 1).  Few
of these studies address the issue of whether manufacturers would abandon investments in
development of new or re-registration of existing “minor use” pesticides.  However, one study
found that a 10 percent increase in “regulatory costs” leads to about a 20 percent decline in the
number of new pesticide registration (Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo, 1998).  It also found that15
regulation encouraged firms to focus research on large crop markets such as corn and soybeans to
the detriment of horticultural crops.  On the other hand, this same study found that a 10 percent
increase in regulatory costs also was found to lead to a 5 percent increase in registrations of less
toxic pesticides.  
There have been enough studies of economic benefits to spawn a growing set of review
articles comparing previous impact studies.  Jaenicke (1997) reviews 17 studies on economic
impacts of pesticide reduction.  Carlson (1998) reviews ten national studies of benefits provided
by atrazine and the triazine herbicides.  Fernandez-Cornejo, Jans and Smith (1998) provide an
excellent review and critique of economic studies of pesticide use.
Unfortunately, existing studies of possible profitability or broader economic impacts of
reductions of pesticides are not very informative for a variety of reasons.  Most of these studies
suffer from severe limitations that limit the drawing of conclusions on profitability.  These
Textbox 1: Examples of Economic Impact Analyses of Pesticide Loss
The economic impact analyses have come in two general forms.  One set has examined the impact of across-the-
board reductions or bans in entire categories of pesticides (e.g., insecticides, herbicides, or fungicides).  These
analyses include the Knutson et. al. studies on U.S. field crops (1990) and on U.S. fruits and vegetables (1993),
and the Pimentel et. al. (1991) study of 40 major U.S. crops.  They also include the Deloitte & Touche analysis of
fungicide benefits to fruits and vegetables in Canada (Deloitte & Touche Management Consultants, 1992).
The second set of economic impact studies have focused on specific pesticides or narrow groups of related
compounds.  The triazine herbicides (National Agricultural Pesticide Impact Assessment Program (NAPIAP),
1992; Carlson, 1998; Swinton et al., 1995; Nowak et al., 1993; Ribaudo and Bouzaher, 1994; Osteen and
Kuchler, 1986) and methyl bromide soil sterilant (Ferguson and Padula, 1994; Deepak et al., 1999) have received
the greatest share of attention, although a few other compounds have also received attention (e.g., Gianessi and
Kopp, 1989, on 2,4-D herbicide; Cox and Easter, 1990, on alachlor herbicide).
While some of the impact analyses have been national in scope, many have taken a regional or even local
perspective.  Among those directly relevant to Michigan agriculture are several that have focused on pesticide loss
in so-called “minor use”crops.  These include comprehensive state-wide assessment efforts (Vergot III, 1994), as
well as more focused, detailed studies of pesticide loss in specific Michigan fruits (Ricks et al., 1993; Swinton and
Scorsone, 1997).  Other potentially relevant regional studies from the Upper Midwest focus on field crop
production in the absence of alachlor herbicide (Cox and Easter, 1990) and the triazine herbicides (Swinton et al.,
1995).16
limitations stem, in part, from the complicated nature of economic impact analysis (see Textbox
2).
Many studies of the economic consequences of pesticide reduction mislead in one or more
of three ways.  First, many focus strictly on private costs incurred, neglecting or sharply
underestimating the benefits that could accrue from reducing the use of pesticides  (Jaenicke,
1997).  Since laws and regulations that reduce pesticide use are motivated by expected benefits,
to omit those benefits from an impact assessment can be misleading, depending on how the
research is portrayed (Bromley, 1994).
Second, most pesticide reduction impact studies seriously underestimate both farmers’
ability to adapt and industry’s ability to develop alternative technologies (Jaenicke, 1997; Moore
and Villarejo, 1996).  
Textbox 2: Complicated Nature of Economic Impact Analysis
The complicated nature of economic impacts from changes in pesticide regulations makes careful impact analysis
a major challenge.  Consider the steps:
1. Choose a set of plausible, politically realistic regulatory scenarios
2. Predict short-term effects on alternative pest management methods, pest control costs, pest
pressure, and crop yields.
3. Predict long-term effects on pest management, costs, pest pressure, crop yields, crop prices, and
prices.  Include price effects due to international trade and products for which crop products are
inputs (e.g., livestock).
4. Predict effects on consumers, producers, and taxpayers.
5. Include nonmarket benefits and costs, such as increased soil erosion if herbicide loss causes
more tillage or reduced cancer rates from banning a carcinogenic fungicide.
While many economic impact studies have done step (2) reasonably well, most have fallen short on the other
points.  The difficulty of forecasting technological change and farming system adjustments (including not just
alternative pest management, but also alternative crop and livestock enterprises) makes long-term prediction of
costs and yields especially difficult (Ayer and Conklin, 1990; Jaenicke, 1997; Moore and Villarejo, 1996). 
Accurate prediction of these yield and cost effects is a prerequisite for accurate forecasts of price changes and the
supply response they trigger (both domestically and for imports), making those “second-round” effects even less17
Because of this omission, actual impacts of known pesticide cancellations have frequently
turned out to be less than many of the impact study predictions (Moore and Villarejo, 1996).
A related shortcoming is that in some impact studies, only a narrow range of alternative
pest management tools is evaluated.  Choosing a single pesticide alternative may simplify the
analysis, but if the more plausible management alternative is a complicated mix of integrated pest
management methods or the substitution of crop insurance for pesticides, then those more
complicated and imaginative alternatives should also be evaluated if reliable estimates of actual
costs are to emerge from the research.
As Porter and van der Linde (1995a and 1995b) have shown, well-designed regulations in
some cases can succeed in inducing innovations that actually create new benefits to the regulated
industries.  Looking beyond agriculture, one of the most striking examples of regulation-induced
innovation is the manufacturing industry’s response to the phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs).  Instead of relying on the environmentally damaging CFCs, affected firms re-examined
and redesigned production processes and found many alternatives that were more cost-effective
than the CFCs they replaced.  The literature on corporate environmental management is peppered
with similar stories of how companies faced with a legal requirement to prevent pollution found
cost-reducing innovations in their production processes (Batie, Ervin, and Schulz, 1998; Hoffman,
1997).   Such technological innovation may be particularly important in efforts to reduce pesticide
use.
   A third shortcoming of many pesticide policy impact studies is that they address an
inappropriate policy scenario.  One approach has been to examine extreme, politically infeasible
scenarios.  This drawback is one of the main criticisms brought against the Knutson et al. studies18
(1990 and 1993) by Ayer and Conklin (1990) and by Smith (1994).  Given the likelihood that
EPA will continue to allow some uses of organophosphate and carbamate insecticides, the
criticism appears to remain valid for Knutson and Smith’s latest effort (1999).  Clearly the cost of
more restrictions is greater than the cost of few restrictions.   But costs rise disproportionately at
the margin as fewer alternative pest controls remain.  Generally, the further a policy scenario
moves from the status quo, the greater the costs (Gianessi, 1993).  The magnitude of complete
bans of pesticides tends to be very different from those of moderate pesticide reduction plans or
residue limitations.  Although not politically viable, the cost of a plan that eliminates pesticides
entirely will be considerably more than double the cost of a plan that reduces pesticide use by half. 
An important caveat with respect to the applicability of many of these impact studies to
the FQPA is that the FQPA targets broad groups of pesticides that have similar mode of action in
human subjects, whereas previous studies focused on the impact of reducing the use of a single
compound, or a narrow group (e.g., triazine herbicides).  Thus, generalizations from many impact
studies to the FQPA are inappropriate.
Studies on the transition to low-chemical pest management
The difficulty of estimating the impact of reductions in pesticide use on producers’ profits
is further complicated by difficulties in determining the financial implications of widespread
transition to bio-based IPM or organic production.  Many producers, both here and abroad, have
already substantially reduced their use of pesticides.  If agricultural producers are to change from
chemical intensive production practices to practices less reliant on chemical intensive systems,19
their capacity to adjust to a loss of chemical alternatives will depend, not only on the extent of
chemical loss, but also, on the availability of reduced chemical alternatives.
Thus, the size of the commitment and the length of the transition depends on what
alternatives are available to replace chemical-intensive production methods.  If only a few high
risk pesticide uses are removed from the farmers’ portfolio, and if reduced risk pesticide
alternatives are available, then the transition period will be short.  If, on the other hand, all farmers
are to move to all bio-based integrated pest management alternatives or to organic production, the
transition period could be lengthy.  Despite numerous private farm success stories using these
practices, this alternative path is quite challenging for many producers (see Textbox 3).  The
reason lies, in part, on the need for producers to learn whole new management systems, for
ecosystems to adjust to fewer chemicals, and for the development of markets and consumer
acceptance.20
There is evidence that, in some circumstances, chemical-free production systems can be
profitable (Welsh, 1999).  For example, a recent study of organic farming systems in the Northern
Great Plains of grain and oilseed production found certain organic systems had net returns to land
and management equal to or greater than the conventional and reduced till farming systems in the
Textbox 3. Examples of Reduced Chemical Pest Management Practices and Systems
Some lower-chemical and organic policy experiments are on-going to better understand the
barriers to such transitions as well as to speed the transition process.  For example, Denmark and
Sweden pay its producers to use organic techniques (Lohr and Salomonsson, 1998).  Some
European experiences have been successful in profitably substituting bio-based practices for
chemical-based ones (Resis, et al., 1994).  White and Wetzstein (1995) calculated that the
benefits to cost ratio to U.S. farmers of using integrated pest management (IPM) practices in
cotton was 6.5 to 1.  A Consumer Union Study (1999) showed a steep decrease in pesticide
residues on U.S. grapes from 1994 to 1996 a decline attributed to the broad adoption of
integrated pest management strategies.  A similar conclusion was reached by another study
(Fernandez-Cornego, 1998).  The Natural Resources Defense Council publication showcases 22
farm operations throughout the U.S. who have reduced chemical use through a variety of
alternative pest management techniques including scouting and monitoring for pests, using
precision pesticide application equipment, rotating crops, switching to biological-based pest
control strategy, and adopting better management and soil-building practices (Curtis, 1998).
On a pilot basis, the U.S. government is also paying some American farmers to experiment with
organic production.  The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) in Iowa provided
funds to supplement organic production practices.  The Wisconsin Potato and Vegetable
Growers, in cooperation with the University of Wisconsin and the World Wildlife Fund, hope to
reduce pesticide reliance.  Several of the pesticides involved are organophosphates or carbamates
(Lynch, 1999 personal communication).  Gerber®  has collaborated with its growers in
Michigan, California and elsewhere to grow peaches for baby food that are free of
organophosphates.  Gerber® selected growing areas where there are fewer difficult pest
problems and, they used pheromones to disrupt mating by harmful insects and found that, after a
transition period, such production was “significantly less costly for growers” (World Regulation
Review, November, 1998).  Similarly, through Campbell Soup Company’s efforts to reduce input
use, growers reduced their use of synthetic insecticides and fungicides for tomatoes by 30
percent, synthetic pesticides for celery by 40-90 percent, and soil fumigation for carrots by 60
percent (Bolkan and Reinert, 1994).  Other food companies are engaging in similar efforts
through environmental stewardship programs with growers to address environmental issues and
protect product quality (Kashmanian and Holtorf, 1998).21
study area (Dobbs, 1994).  Although, a transition period of a few years maybe required before the
switch from conventional to organic becomes profitable (Smolik and Dobbs, 1991).  A
comparative analysis of an organic apple production system in coastal California found that the
organic production system yielded a greater net return per hectare (using grower-received farm
gate premiums of 38 percent (1990) and 33 percent (1991) for unsorted, certified organic apples)
than the conventional management system.  The organic production system required higher
material and labor inputs in all years (Swezey et al., 1998).  Welsh (1999) reviewed six land-grant
university studies comparing organic and conventional grain cropping systems in the Midwestern
United States.  Results of three of the studies indicate that, without price premiums, the organic
cropping systems were more profitable than the most common conventional system, generally a
corn-soybean system in three studies; and, they were less profitable than the most common
conventional system in three studies.  Furthermore, each of the organic systems were always more
profitable than the continuous corn systems, even without price premiums.
It must be noted, however, that any comparative study must be interpreted carefully since
profitability will be influenced by existing institutions, available technology, demand and supply
factors, as well as land characteristics (Batie, 1998).  In addition, there are, in many cases, price
premiums which offset any potential yield decreases (Dobbs, 1998).  Such price premiums would
most likely dissipate in the long run with increased volumes of organic production, unless
consumer demand grows proportionally to the increase in production.  However, there is at least
anecdotal evidence that the cost of growing and marketing organic food are falling as the industry
expands (Welsh,1999). Nevertheless, although “going organic” may be promising in some cases,11A similar statement applies for biotechnology products that reduce chemical residues
(Zilberman and Millock, 1997).
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and, despite the growing market share of organic products, the organic production, if measured in
terms of percentage of total food production is still in its infancy.
11
Policy research needs
As indicated earlier, most policy research on farm profitability related to reduced pesticide
use has taken the form of economic impact analyses.  Though most of the studies have important
limitations, the value of additional impact studies is highly questionable.  Not only are such studies
costly and subject to criticism, they are unlikely to make a productive contribution to the FQPA
debate.  As passed into law, the FQPA explicitly excludes farm income impacts from
consideration in pesticide review decisions.  These decisions are to be made entirely on the basis
of attendant health risks and benefits to consumers.  Health risks take priority, unless there is a
“significant-disruption” in the food supply comparable to the one that occurred when aflatoxin
contaminated U.S. feed corn in the late 1980's (Phillips and Gianessi, 1998).
A more productive approach to policy research on farm profitability is to examine the
consequences of alternative ways of implementing the FQPA.  Each alternative should be
evaluated based on its ability to meet its goal of reducing human health risks in a manner that (a)
leaves agricultural producers the greatest possible flexibility and (b) leads to investments in
research and development to assist producers to make profitable transition production systems
that result in lower food dietary risks.  There is a real need for policy analysis that focuses on
regulatory alternatives (means) rather than regulatory ends (Bromley, 1994).  12For example, in Part II we explore possible policy vehicles–such as transition insurance
and educational assistance that could reduce negative impacts on farm profitability form the
implementation of the FQPA.
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One such policy analysis need is to examine alternative means to meet FQPA pesticide
residue standards on various food products.  These needs are discussed in greater detail in an
accompanying paper (“Part II: FQPA Implementation Alternatives and Strategies”)
12.  Another
policy analysis need is to estimate the crop production loss threshold that would qualify as a
“significant-disruption” in the food supply so that the EPA would have clear guidance on when it
is legitimate to consider pesticide benefits in implementing FQPA (Phillips and Gianessi, 1998).
Implications: Farm Profitability
The impact on farm profitability of the FQPA will depend on its implementation details. 
In general, the more major the changes needed to be made in existing farming practices, and the
shorter period of time to make the adjustments, the higher the potential impacts on farmer
profitability.  It is doubtful that there will be price premiums offered for reduced use of higher risk
pesticides except for a few speciality markets.  Also, the more producers move to a reduced
chemical system of production, the more they will need to acquire new knowledge and
management skills. 
Because of the variability of agriculture across the country, the loss of certain uses of
pesticides will have uneven impacts.  In Michigan, for example, the apple-azinphos-methyl (apple-
Guthion), crop-pesticide combination is particularly vulnerable.  Should this use be eliminated by
the FQPA, many apple growers question whether other profitable alternative pesticides or
practices exist.  Because other regions’ apple growers may not have the same pests as Michigan,24
Michigan growers also fear they would become the high cost producers, even if they found other
effective, but more expensive apple maggot pest control methods.
Import Competition Concerns
The second producer concern surrounding the implementation of the FQPA is import
competition.  This issue is defined in terms of potential impacts to U.S. producers’ 
competitiveness with foreign producers due to FQPA.  The state of knowledge surrounding this
concern is presented.  Finally, implications for international competitiveness are developed.
Defining the Issue: Import Competition Concerns
Apart from worries about farm profitability impacts, producers are also concerned that the
FQPA might undermine the competitive position of U.S. food products in world markets,
including domestic markets.  This concern involves how the EPA will include chemical uses from
imported sources in the risk cup: that is, will imported foods reduce the size of the risk cup
available for domestic producers?  Such concerns are understandable given the heavy reliance of
U.S. agriculture on chemicals and the increasing share of imported foods.  
One way to better understand this concern is to assume that FQPA implementation will
reduce crop yields.  However, such reduced domestic food production need not imply reduced
farm incomes.  Studies on the domestic impact of pesticide bans have shown that in many cases,
due to inelastic consumer demand, farm income actually increases as the quantity supplied is
diminished.  For example, Knutson et al (1990) projected significant field crop yield losses from
an (unrealistic) complete pesticide ban coupled with rising crop prices, and predicted,25
“These crop price increases would convert to sharp increases in gross receipts to crop
producers.  Under the no chemical option, for example, producers’ gross income in 1994
for the eight crops studied would increase by 18 percent from the $58.6 billion baseline to
$69 billion under no pesticides and by 34 percent from the baseline to $78.6 billion with
no chemicals.  Despite cost increases associated with each chemical use reduction
scenario, crop producers would experience a sharp increase in average real net farm
income from $13.3 billion under the baseline to $20.6 billion with no pesticides and $29.3
billion with no chemicals during the 1995-98 period.  Again, this increase in income would
assume perfect producer knowledge; instant adjustments in crop mix; specified changes in
cropping patterns; and a willingness on behalf of producers to endure a greater intensity of
farm management, labor supervision, and labor input.”
However, such conclusions of improved farm income would be invalidated if either (1) aggregate
U.S. yields did not decline with reductions in certain pesticide uses, or if (2) direct import
competition significantly increased. Another way this concern is expressed is that, even if yields
do not decrease, foreign competitors might have a lower cost of production advantage if they
have access to chemicals unavailable to Americans. 
The United States currently imports about 15 to 20 percent of its total domestic
consumption of agricultural products.  Imported fresh fruit is now about one-third of total
domestic consumption (GAO, 1998).  This amounts to over 5.6 billion pounds of imported fruit
and 8.4 billion pounds of vegetables (USDA, ERS, 1999).  Of course, pesticides are used in the
production and storage of these imports.  While the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA) prohibits the importation of food with pesticide residues greater than the tolerances
permitted within the United States, the monitoring and testing of imported products may be
insufficient to ensure that such tolerances are universally enforced (Schierow, 1998; GAO, 1998; 13For example, over a two year period the FDA tested only 72 samples of bananas for
benomyl. During the same period nearly 25 billion bananas were imported into the U.S. (Wargo,
1996).
14There is also a concern over foreign use of compounds that are neither registered in the
U.S. nor tested for their toxicity. 
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Wargo, 1996).
13  Wargo (1996), for example, notes that only 8,000 samples are taken from
imported fruit and vegetables yearly.  This amount is the equivalent of only one residue test for
each 2 million pounds of imported foods.
14  Some claim that this level of enforcement can lead to
unfair competition with U.S. food products and/or unsafe foods in the domestic supply. 
However, other analysts do not agree that the FQPA compliance would endanger the
competitiveness of U.S. food products nor that enforcement is inadequate (Textbox 4 offers
several such counter arguments.)
Textbox 4. Views on Why FQPA May Not Hurt U.S. Trade Competitiveness
Despite the common notion that compliance with the FQPA will damage the competitiveness of U.S. producers,
research on this issue is not definitive.
FQPA supporters note that for many foods, a higher percentage of imported foods is tested for chemical residues
than is tested domestically.  A recent Consumer Union study (1999) found no noteworthy difference in the
detection of illegal residues and imported products with samples of each having violation rates of less than 5
percent.  There are also considerable incentives for foreign exporters to voluntarily comply with U.S. standards. 
These incentives include severe penalties for violations, exporters’ desire to maintain good reputations as
reliable suppliers, as well as joint foreign-domestic ownership arrangements (Cook, personal communication,
December 21, 1998; Marchant and Ballenger, 1994).  Indeed, there is an argument that, because of the size of
the U.S. market, the U.S., in some sense, sets “the standards that other countries adopt” (Ervin, personal
communication, February 12, 1999).  
An additional complicating factor is the difficulty of assessing the comparability of residue standards in the
United States and other countries.  While there is often an assumption that major differences exist between the
standards of the United States and its trading partners, evidence on this issue is mixed.  For example, the United
States maintains regular communication with major food trade partners like Mexico to provide greater “health
protection for both the American and Mexican consumers by eliminating the use of non-registered pesticides,
standardizing pesticide residue analyses, and improving communication” (GAO, 1992, p. 43). Also, some
countries, like Japan, have stricter residue requirements on many chemicals than does the United States
(Marchant and Ballenger, 1994).  Indeed, the Consumer Union study (1999) concluded that much imported
produce had lower or less toxic residues than does domestic produce.  Furthermore, not all imports directly
compete with U.S. production due to differences in seasonal availability.27
If more pesticide uses are restricted under FQPA, an additional trade question will arise: 
If U.S. farmers  are denied a chemical input that is legal to use in other countries, and if such use
does not leave a detectable residue, will U.S. farmers be placed at a competitive disadvantage
relative to foreign producers?  The question assumes that the EPA will implement bans on certain
pesticide uses as opposed to residue limits.
The answer depends only in part, on how much the use of the chemical would lower
production costs relative to other costs in the production and transportation of the product. 
There are many factors to consider in making this comparison, including other non-chemical costs
of production, whether a chemical is actually used and its actual impact on yields, and whether the
imported products are in direct competition with domestic production.  Therefore, while
competitive disadvantages could result from the implementation of the FQPA, each case would
need to be examined individually.
Michigan producers are particularly sensitive to this concern.  Table 2 illustrates the
vulnerability of Michigan producers to foreign competition, based on the level of domestic U.S.
consumption of imported fruit and vegetable products that are also grown in Michigan.  For
example, 5.3 percent of fresh potatoes and 4.6 percent of processed potatoes are imported to the
U.S.–almost entirely from Canada.  Potato producers clearly want to remain competitive with
Canadian producers and are concerned if they lose important uses of pesticides such as Monitor
(methamidophos), an organophosphate.  Much of this competition is direct competition and is of
more concern to Michigan producers than, say, the importation of fresh asparagus from Mexico
which is seasonally available at a time when Michigan producers are not producing fresh
asparagus.28
A related concern is when other countries’ grades and standards forbid the importation of
U.S. products unless they have been treated with pesticides.  For example, in order to be imported
to Brazil, Michigan apples must be sprayed with azinphos-methyl (Guthion) to assure there are no
apple maggots.  Loss of Guthion might therefore equate with the loss of the Brazilian market for
Michigan apple producers, unless some substitute treatment is acceptable to Brazilian importers.
State of Knowledge: International Competitiveness Under Reduced Pesticide Use 
Empirical studies to resolve these international competitiveness issues are fragmentary and
inconclusive, for a variety of complex reasons.  There are few studies which address the
competitiveness question.  Some studies have shown that U.S. pesticide regulation has not caused
significant economic loss to the farm sector (Osteen and Szmedra, 1989).  One analysis of
whether Canadian environmental laws have disadvantaged Canadian farmers relative to their
American counterparts, found that the actual effects on competitiveness were not large (Deen and
Fox, 1991; McEwen and Deen, 1997).  A similar conclusion for U.S. southern crops was reached
by Marchant and Ballenger (1994).  A common thread in these studies is that any change in the
costs of production due to environmental compliance are insignificant relative to other factors
such as exchange rates, and costs of transportation, processing, and retailing.  Such conclusions
are reinforced by studies of nonagricultural industries.  These studies have found remarkably little
evidence that either trade or industrial locations has been a result of various environmental
regulations.  Ervin and Fox (1998) summarizes the evidence to date:
“Comprehensive reviews conclude that compliance costs have caused insignificant output
reductions on average, and show little if any evidence of any significant trade impacts
(Dean, 1992).  The lack of significant effects may reflect a host of offsetting influences,
e.g., similar environmental programs across competing exporters, exchange rate forces,
and management and technology innovations.” (p. 10).29
While these studies reach similar conclusions, their applicability to understanding the impact of the
FQPA is limited as they were conducted before any implementation of the FQPA.
Studies on competitive relationships are also hampered by lack of information about which
countries allow which chemicals for which agricultural uses.  Furthermore, there is a lack of data
on actual rates of use.  Mexico, for example, accounts for 55 percent all fresh and frozen fruits
and vegetables exported to the United States (USDA, 1997). The Mexican climate, soil and pest
conditions are quite different from most of the United States’ conditions.  Pesticides that have
efficacy in the United States may not perform as well in Mexico, and vice versa.  For example, a
1992 GAO study found 17 pesticides used in Mexico that do not have U.S. pesticide residue
tolerances, five of which are used on foods imported into the United States.  The toxicity of these
pesticides may be of concern, but sampling and testing is quite limited.  Furthermore, not all
tolerances apply to the same crops in the United States and Mexico.  Thus, it may be that limiting
a chemical use on a crop in the United States may have little to no impact on production practices
for the same crop in Mexico, where the chemical is not be used on that crop.  Even when
comparisons are made for a pesticide crop on domestic versus imported foods, the results are
inconclusive.  In one such comparison, fungicide residues and several insecticides were higher on
imported grapes than domestic, but, dicloran fungicide residues and insecticides (parathion-
methyl) were higher on domestic peaches (Kuchler, et al., 1996; Consumers Union, 1999).  The
issue of imported versus domestic residues must be resolved on a case by case basis; unfortunately
the necessary information to do so is not readily available.
Also due to seasonal differences, many fresh market crops that are grown in other
countries do not compete directly with the same crops in the United States.  For example, many30
Latin American fruits and vegetables may capture the winter U.S. markets, but their production
diminishes by the time of the first spring Californian harvest.  Still later, the Washington and
Michigan fresh products enter the market.  In such a case, differences in pesticide compliance
requirements may not have a major affect on competitive relationships in these cases.
For certain other cases, however, there may be significant competitive disadvantages for
U.S. growers. Processed products which can be stored will face direct competition from foreign
producers.  Likewise, certain regions of the United States compete directly with fresh product
imports for selected commodities during certain seasons.  For example, in the U.S. winter market
for fresh tomatoes and strawberries, Florida produce competes head-to-head with Mexican
produce for significant periods.  In the case of methyl bromide, a soil and post-harvest fumigant,
analysis suggests that Mexico would gain market share from Florida farmers for tomatoes,
eggplants, bellpeppers, cucumbers and strawberries following a proposed unilateral U.S. ban on
the use of methyl bromide (Deepak, Spreen and Van Sickle,1999).  Studies of competitiveness
must carefully analyze the nature of the competition as well as the pesticide rates of use on a case-
by-case basis.
Policy research needs
Any research to determine whether reduced availability of chemicals in the United States
would have a significant impact on the competitiveness of U.S. crop products will require
comprehensive, accessible data bases on chemical use across countries by crop, actual chemical
use by country by crop, and residue detection capabilities by crop.  Without such data, it is
difficult for EPA to determine the role of imports in allocating uses for the “risk cup.” On the
other hand, if the FQPA is implemented using a residue limit, and if detection and enforcement of31
residues at borders is adequate, then less data and research on the impact of differential access
would be required to allocate imports to the risk cup. 
Implications: International Competitiveness
The trade impacts of the implementation of the FQPA are dependent on implementation
details.  Any definitive research to resolve this issue would require comprehensive data bases on
chemical uses by crop across countries.  It does appear that some fresh product imports which
compete directly with domestic products–such as, Michigan potatoes competing with Canadian
potatoes–could be negatively impacted if the FQPA conferred a production cost advantage to
Canadian imports.  If the FQPA uses strict residue standards by crop, regardless of country of
origin, however, and if such standards are strictly enforced, there should be no competitive
disadvantages posed to U.S. products by the FQPA since all production would be required to
meet the same standards.  For example, with this implementation strategy, U.S. imports of
Chinese apple juice would have to meet the same residue requirements as domestic apple juice.
The adequacy of import inspections, then, becomes a key policy concern then, for an FQPA
strategy that relies on residue standards.  There still would remain situations where other
countries’ grades and standards would need to be renegotiated to assure market access for U.S.
products.
Consumer Resistance Concerns
The third producer concern surrounding the implementation of the FQPA involves
consumer resistance to U.S. grown fruits and vegetables.   This consumer resistance is defined in
terms of consumer resistance to purchase fruits and vegetables due to increased blemishes from15There is an accompanying argument–not related to producers livelihood--that if
consumers (particularly lower income consumers) must sacrifice other purchases for the sake of
maintaining their accustomed diets, then they may not be better off than they were with pesticide
residues on cheaper, better quality food.  
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pest damage, and/or potentially higher consumer prices. The state of knowledge surrounding this
concern is presented.  Finally, implications for consumer resistance are developed.
Defining the Issue: Consumer Resistance Concerns
A third major concern of producers is that the benefits of reduced pesticide residue risk on
food could carry unrecognized costs for consumers.  These costs take two forms.  First, if the risk
cup excludes certain pesticide uses, the quality of fruits and vegetables may suffer due to
increased blemishes from pest damage, leading consumers to reject these products as inferior. 
Second, if reduced pesticide access causes higher unit costs for producers, these higher costs
could trigger a decline in quantity supplied.  Such a reduction could in turn lead to increases in
price that meet with consumer resistance.
15 
Also, some argue that, if fungal diseases were to result from reduced fungicide use, these
diseases could conceivably pose food-borne health risks that offset some of the health protections
gained by reduced fungicide use.  A collateral point is that the FQPA and the FIFRA do not
govern older non-synthetic pesticides, so they do not cover human health risks from such
“organic” pesticides such as nicotine sulfate.  If banning certain chemicals meant a return to such
older non-synthetic pesticides, then risks to human health could actually increase.  However, since
the FQPA explicitly allows for consideration of the impacts of any regulatory decision on human16There is a strong argument here for careful consideration of all health risks within the
FQPA mandate–including, for example, the risks of eating organic versus conventional diets or
transported versus local production.
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health, these last concerns translate into a need for research to better identify and quantify the
health risks associated with reduced access to pesticides or various mitigation strategies.
16 
There are potential opportunities for producers that emerge from consumer concerns with
food safety.  Increasingly, U.S. agriculture is dividing into two types of markets–one is the low
cost production of commodities; the other is the value-added, consumer-focused production of
consumer desired food attributes (Drabenstott, 1999).  This second type of market does not
require low cost production per se, rather it demands high value consumer benefits per consumer
dollar spent.  
One such attribute desired by consumers could be reduced food risks due to reduced
pesticide residues–provided to both domestic and export markets.  Capturing these markets
requires that consumers be aware, through labeling or other communication methods, of the
reduced risk attributes when making purchases (Wargo, 1996).  Gerber®, for example, pursues a
strategy of achieving no detectable residues on their final product.  To achieve this result,
Gerber® provides very strict pesticide use requirements within their grower contracts.
However, many producers are wary of depending on the consumers’ willingness to pay for
organic or reduced residue foods until it is determined whether such markets emerge and are
robust and profitable.  They also express concern about the wisdom, the feasibility and the
profitability of labeling these food attributes of reduced pesticide in the grocery.  They fear such17Ecolabel programs are being developed in many countries to differentiate and enhance
revenues for products  produced under environmentally preferable conditions.  An ecolabel
identifies environmentally preferable products based on an environmental impact assessment of
the product compared to other products in the same category or by country-of-origin
environmental requirements.  Ecolabels are much like a seal of approval.  When developed by
governments, they are awarded by a public or private nonprofit organization that establishes
environmental standards for product categories and certifies that products meet those standards
(van Ravenswaay and Blend, 1998).  Though ecolabels are more prevalent in European markets,
the most notable example of an ecolabel in the United States is the “dolphin-safe” label on tuna.
34
labeling will stigmatize non-labeled foods.  Furthermore, they question whether the accuracy of
ecolabels
17 will be enforced as well as whether they will receive adequate prices for their efforts.
State of Knowledge: Consumer Resistance Concerns
The validity of many of the farmers’ concerns about consumer demand for reduced
pesticide foods depends on the validity of three assumptions:  (a) that pesticide bans or reductions
lead to increased producer costs, (b) that increased producer costs lead to increased consumer
prices, (c) that the quality of fresh products will worsen, and (d) that consumers will reduce their
purchases in response to increased prices or decrease quality.  There is little research to resolve
these issues but, given the low price elasticity of food, the low amount of disposable income spent
on food by most customers, and the small additional cost of pesticides in most production
budgets, there is reason to suspect that the conclusion of increased consumer expenditures on
food following the FQPA implementation would, at best, apply to only very poor consumers. 
Knutson et al. (1990) found $18 billion in aggregate consumer food expenditure increases likely
to result from whole-scale, all-pesticide bans.  For many consumers, however, such an (unlikely)
wholesale ban would translate into only a few dollars per month (about 3 percent increase in
aggregate food expenditures and less than $12 extra per month for each member of the civilian
labor force). 35
With respect to reduced-pesticide product markets, there is limited research on both
consumers’  perceptions of pesticides and on how these perceptions translate into purchases
(CAST, 1995).  The findings of various recent studies strongly indicate that many consumers are
interested in food health and safety and about the methods used to grow food (Richman, 1999). A
study by the Food Marketing Institute (1997) found that 74 percent of surveyed American
consumers perceived pesticide residues as a “serious hazard.”  A 1990 study of 1,860 North
Carolina shoppers found that 60 percent believe that chemicals in the food supply are a matter of
high concern (Eom, 1992).
While the growing level of media coverage chronicling public exposure to pesticides and
their related health and food safety impacts suggests that public concern about exposure to
pesticides will continue (Office of Technology Assessment, 1995), there are differences between
consumers. For example, the Food Marketing Institute’s 1997 study found that 37 percent of
consumers in the East purchase organic produce versus 29 percent in the West (Thompson,
1998).  Van Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1991a) have conducted extensive research in the area of
consumer perspectives on chemical residues in food; they have found that perceptions of risk from
pesticide residues differ greatly among consumers.  One implication is that there are major
differences in information needs, policy preferences, and market niches among the public.      
According to The Hartman Report (1996), a majority of American consumers are willing
to buy environmentally friendly products.  It appears that a growing number of consumers are
seeking food grown without pesticides, or under “environmentally friendly” production systems. 
For example, a study by the American Farm Bureau Federation of a small group of suburban36
consumers in Rosemont, Illinois, found an average willingness to spend $21 per week more to
“ensure a safer food supply” (Lipton and Fields, 1999).
Following the Alar episode, van Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1991a and 1991b) found that
U.S. consumers would pay on average $0.24 more per pound for apples that were “pesticide-
free” at a time that apples normally cost $0.79 per pound.  A 1990 survey of 600 Michigan
households found that 38 percent would pay more than a 10 percent increase for food products
grown without the use of chemicals (Atkin, 1990).  Various recent studies and surveys on
consumer attitudes toward natural foods have found that 30 to 40 percent of consumers would
buy reduced-pesticide foods at slightly higher prices, such as a 10 percent price premium for
organic produce (Richman, 1999).
In one of the few studies of consumers’ response to reduced food quality, U.S. consumers
were asked to evaluate color photographs of apples with varying levels of pest damage and
varying prices (van Ravenswaay and Hoehn study, 1991a & 1991b).  They estimated that
consumers would accept damage of about 7.5 percent of the visible area in return for guarantees
that residues were below federal limits and if prices did not change.  These findings are consistent
with other studies that show that some customers will accept mild damage from pests in exchange
for reduced pesticide residue (CAST, 1995).    
However, whether consumers would actually pay such increases in a real world setting is
questionable. A survey of Georgia consumers concluded that, despite strong consumer
preferences for certified pesticide free produce, most would not pay a price premium of more than
10 percent for the product (Misra, Huang and Ott, 1991).  One implication drawn by the authors
was that consumers may expect the government to assure that fresh produce is free of pesticide37
residues. Eom (1992) also found consumer resistance to higher prices in his study of North
Carolina shoppers.  When consumers’ responsiveness to price increases was tested in hypothetical
questioning, each 1 percent increase in the price of a less risky produce reduced the likelihood
consumers would purchase it by 0.57 percent.
Policy research needs
The markets for organic foods and other foods produced by using methods that are
“environmentally-friendly” are growing by 20 percent per year, yet, they still represent less than 2
percent of overall food sales (Welsh, 1999).  This percentage translates into a United States and
European Union market for organic food of about $6 billion in total sales (Welsh, 1999).  Food
companies are responding to consumers’ desire for pesticide-free foods, by introducing new
“green” brands, yet surprisingly little is known about consumer reaction to these brands or about
the impact of public education on consumer preferences.  Indeed, as food production increasingly
is consumer-focused, understanding consumer demands and then communicating those demands
from the table all the way to the farmer and farm input suppliers, will become crucial for business
success.
Implications: Consumer Resistance Concerns
While research suggests nearly three-fourths of Americans are concerned about pesticide
residues, research is inconclusive about whether consumers will pay premiums for large volumes
of reduced pesticide residue foods.  Some studies suggest that there is consumer resistance to
price increases above 10 percent.  Consumer preferences are dynamic and could easily change
with more information, however.  Even though there is a growing and profitable markets for
pesticide-free foods, and there are many case studies of profitable farm enterprises with organic or38
low pesticide practices, such markets for these products represent only about two percent of
sales.  And, while the food system is evolving to provide attributes that consumers desire, and
lower pesticide risk is clearly one such attribute, there is a lack of research to undergird pursuit of
these markets by large numbers of producers.  We know little about: (1) those final product
attributes for which the consumers are willing to pay, including specifically (2) whether they are
really willing to pay more for products produced with lower pesticide use.  As a result, there is no
certainty that if many farmers pursued organic markets, there would be price premiums over and
above prices paid for conventional production.  Economics suggests, however, that the
production and marketing costs for organic production should decrease overtime as more
research and development is directed toward this method of production.
 Pest Resistance
The fourth producer concern surrounding the implementation of the FQPA is pest
resistance.   Pest resistance is first defined and then the state of knowledge surrounding this
concern is presented.  Finally, implications for pest resistance are developed.
Defining the Issue: Pest Resistance
A longer term concern by producers is that the loss of certain pesticides or pesticide uses
could hasten pest resistance to the remaining pesticides.  Geneticists have long observed that
heavy reliance on just one or two means of pest control creates strong “selection pressure” for the
survival of those individuals with resistance traits.  A reduction in the number of pesticides
available in farmers’ pest management portfolio could result in greater reliance on those that
remain, raising the odds that pests become resistant to the legal tools remaining.  Hence,39
producers fear losing – by means of biological resistance – those safer pesticides not lost by
regulatory means.
A supporting argument holds that access to pesticides may be a key to maintaining a safe
food supply during the next few years.  After fifty years of synthetic pesticide research and
development, American agriculture is highly dependent on pesticides.  In recent decades, we have
refined our farming systems so that integrated pest management (IPM) techniques and more
specialized chemistries have reduced the number of pesticide sprays and the application rates.  But
many IPM tools follow Teddy Roosevelt’s maxim to “talk softly but carry a big stick,”relying on
the presence of efficacious pesticide weapons that can be applied in the event that “softer” low-
pesticide use methods fail.  Without those powerful back-up weapons, more frequent sprays
would probably be required, if current quality standards were to be met with assurance.
It may be prudent, therefore, to examine the various services provided by each FQPA
targeted chemical.  For example, a pesticide might be used as a backup weapon in support of IPM
techniques, it may be used for cosmetic purposes, or it may be used to protect the crop from pest-
related destruction.  In the instance of FQPA-targeted pesticides that enhance food safety
indirectly (e.g., by reducing the potential for major pests to develop genetic resistance to a small
set of remaining pest controls), such compounds might be found worth maintaining for restricted
use.  Even relatively risky pesticides could play valuable roles in the near future for maintaining
the viability of IPM programs and preventing pest resistance to safer pesticides.  The validity of
these concerns is dependent on the FQPA implementation details and whether some uses of
relatively risky chemicals remain available.40
State of Knowledge: pest resistance
The development of pest resistance to chemical controls is well-documented (Office of
Technology Assessment, 1995).  Recent experience with corn rootworm in the Midwest has
shown that pests can even develop resistance to nonchemical controls such as crop rotation. 
There is also a growing literature on the effectiveness of various IPM programs, but any
assessments of these programs’ effectiveness is complicated by the heterogeneity of regions, time,
and crops involved (Fernandez-Cornejo, Jans, and Smith, 1998).  Norton and Mullen (1994)
reviewed 44 studies of IPM programs and concluded that IPM use reduced pesticide use by 15
percent.  However, there do not appear to be studies that link the success of IPM to the
availability of particular chemicals as backup weapons.  
There is also considerable research now being directed at the development of biological
pesticides–or biopesticides.  These include bacteria, viruses and fungi.  In addition, genetic
engineering holds promise to reduce dependence of certain pesticides.  Without a lengthy
transition plan under the FQPA, however, the introduction of new products may be too far out in
time to ameliorate immediate concerns about some pesticide losses.
Policy research needs
In addition to research addressing the role played by specific pesticides in successful IPM
techniques, there is a considerable research agenda for improved bio-based alternatives to
chemical-based farming practices.  For example, although a great deal of the research on
ecological pest management is generalizable and applicable to the FQPA context, some is not. 
There are numerous research needs in this area.  Biological organisms behave differently under
different growing conditions, cropping systems and regulations vary among states.  Population41
growth rates, economic thresholds and recommended management practices often differ.  Thus,
the best ecological pest management research for an individual farmer is that which is designed for
his or her own eco-region.  In addition, bio-intensive IPM systems must evolve in step with new
pests, with changes in the economics of crop production, tillage and planting systems, and with
technology and the many other factors that can influence pest populations (Benbrook, 1996). 
Research is needed to tailor systems to farms and regions.  Other examples of possible research
are discussed in Textbox 5.  
Textbox 5. Illustrations from a Long Term Research Agenda to Complement FQPA
There is considerable research on improved pest control methods that, if completed, would
greatly assist in managing dietary risks from pesticides.  The following research needs are
meant to be illustrative and not comprehensive.
Plant diseases.  Soil microbes can either trigger or strengthen plant immune systems so that
later in life plants can better withstand a degree of plant pathogen pressure or insect attack. 
Soil microbial activity also plays a direct role in the bio-control of nematodes, soil-borne insects
and associated pest pathogens.  This phenomenon is referred to as systemic acquired resistance
(SAR), an area receiving much research attention that may lead to a new generation of
biopesticides.  Research exploring the linkages between plant genetic traits and soil microbial
communities is needed to identify those genes in plants which trigger positive changes in
microbial communities, in turn benefitting the plant through enhanced nutrition or ability to
withstand pest pressure (Benbrook, 1996).
Weeds.  Weed management is an area in which scientists are beginning to make important
discoveries, but much more research is needed.  Most soils contain natural pathogens that
survive by attacking the roots of weeds rather than plants.  Scientists are discovering that a
combination of biological mechanisms can create weed suppressive soils.  Additionally,
scientists have discovered that microbes and arthropods can play an important role in weed
management by eating weed seeds directly or breaking them down through microbial processes
(Benbrook, 1996).42
Low-risk biopesticides are essential components of biointensive IPM systems, but research
directed at biopesticides is fragmentary and incomplete.  Low-risk biopesticides are compounds
which include microorganisms, viruses, insect pheromones, and natural chemicals derived from
plants.  Research needs to evolve in tandem with insect resistance to various chemicals so that
practices continue to emerge to develop and improve lower risk ways to control or prevent pest
damage (Office of Technology Assessment, 1995).
Particularly important for the FQPA purposes is research directed at managing insect pests
using pheromones for mating disruption, lures and traps.  Pheromones are chemicals naturally
secreted by insects for communicating in various ways.  Pheromone mating disruption is the use
of large amounts synthetically made insect pheromones for the express purpose of confusing male
and female insects so that they fail to find each other and mate.  Pheromone lures and traps in the
field are used by consultants in pest management to monitor insect pest populations for the
purpose of timing pesticide sprays and non-chemical pest control practices.  Pheromone lures and
traps are used differently for each insect and control measure.  Research is also needed to lower
the cost of adoption of pheromone lures and traps.
Implications: Pest Resistance
The importance of this pest resistance concern is dependent on how the FQPA is
implemented.  Reduced availability of pesticides, particularly complete bans of classes of
chemicals, may translate into over reliance on a few remaining pest control weapons, resulting in
accelerated development of genetic pest resistance.  This vicious cycle of fewer pest control
options hastening the reduced effectiveness of those pest controls that remain can be broken by
(1) undertaking considerably more research into non-pesticide methods of pest control, (2)43
implementing the FQPA in a manner that does not prohibit all uses of broad classes of pesticides,
or (3) developing new classes of pesticides that are lower risk.
Conclusion
The four major concerns of producers--producer profitability, international and domestic
competitiveness, consumer reactions, and pest resistance development--are all legitimate and
should be addressed if the implementation of the FQPA reduces or eliminates broad classes of
pesticides.  Even in the more likely event that the FQPA prohibits only certain pesticide uses or
relies on residue standards, many uncertainties remain.  Because these uncertainties potentially
impact producers’ livelihoods many argue for a go-slow, long transition for any major changes in
the way they farm or the pest control products they use. 
Balancing these agricultural concerns are a parallel set of concerns expressed by consumer
and environmental groups.  They are worried that the FQPA’s promise to protect infants and
children from pesticide risks will be sabotaged by lax implementation.  They note that emerging
research casts suspicion on various pesticides impact on human health–particularly infants and
children.  Infants and children proportionally eat, drink and breathe more food, water, and air than
do adults.  Because they are still developing, their systems are more sensitive to exposure to
toxins.  Long-term trends show that childhood cancers have risen by one-third since 1950; and
similar increases have occurred in neuro-behavioral effects such as attention deficit disorders. 
Some evidence suggests pesticides may be partially responsible for these trends.  There is also
concern that there may be possible endocrine disruption and reproduction effects caused by the
use of some pesticides.  While research and empirical evidence is fragmentary and inconclusive as
to how much, if any, of these problems relate to agricultural’s use of pesticides, many44
experts–including National Academy of Science panels–have advocated that the U.S. should
adopt a conservative approach in order to protect sensitive sub-populations from cumulative
exposures (NRC, 1993).  It is this conservative approach that is embedded in the FQPA mandate.
The common element that emerges from this review of the evidence is: Impacts on
producers will depend on how FQPA is implemented.  Having established that bans on the use of
broad categories of pesticides would be economically damaging, little value is to be gained from
more research measuring just how damaging those impacts would be. 
The issue is no longer whether to implement FQPA in a way that would cancel broad
categories of pesticide uses.  Instead, the question is now how to implement the Act in a way that
meets its food safety mandate while minimizing the likely adjustment costs to food producers.  In
“Part II: FQPA Implementation Alternatives and Strategies,” the authors assess alternative cost-
effective ways to prioritize pesticide uses and make the transition to agricultural production that
meets FQPA standards for food safe from risky pesticide residues.45
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Table 1: Michigan fruits and vegetables: value of production and number of organophosphate (OP) and carbamate pesticides in use










Apples $45,000,000 $54,750,000 11 Organophosphate, carbamate
Potatoes $14,483,700 $79,566,300 8 Organophosphate, carbamate
Blueberries $20,748,000 $32,450,000 4 Organophosphate, carbamate
Cucumbers $15,792,000 $19,760,000 5 Organophosphate, carbamate
Cherries, tart $156,000 $34,320,000 7 Organophosphate, carbamate
Cherries, sweet $370,000 $19,610,000 5 Organophosphate, carbamate
Carrots $16,563,000 $2,340,000 2 Carbamate
Tomatoes $9,583,000 $9,053,000 6 Organophosphate, carbamate
Asparagus $3,120,000 $14,672,000 2 Organophosphate, carbamate
Corn, sweet $17,408,000 no longer grown commercially  4 Organophosphate, carbamate
Celery $17,081,000 (fresh & processing) 5 Organophosphate, carbamate
Peaches $16,190,000 (fresh & processing) 7 Organophosphate, carbamate
Beans, snap $2,146,000 $13,451,000 3 Organophosphate
Grapes $50,400 $15,321,600 5 Organophosphate, carbamate
Peppers, bell $7,817,000 4 Organophosphate, carbamate
Strawberries $6,960,000 $451,000 4 Organophosphate, carbamate
Cabbage $3,853,000 4 Organophosphate, carbamate
Cantaloupe $2,237,000 2 Organophosphate, carbamate
Cauliflower $2,174,000 (fresh & processing) 4 Organophosphate, carbamate
Plums $532,500 $1,242,500 6 Organophosphate, carbamate
Pears $1,000,000 6 Organophosphate, carbamate
1 Michigan Agricultural Statistics 1997-1998
2 Organophosphate and/or carbamate pesticides identified as potentially affected by the FQPA in one or more of the following sources: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs,  Organophosphate Use and
Usage Information (http://www.epa.gov/oppbead1/matrices); Consumers Union 1998 study “Worst First: High-Risk Insecticide Uses, Children’s Foods and Safer Alternatives; Consumers Union 1999 study “Do You Know What
You’re Eating? An Analysis Of U.S. Government Data On Pesticide Residues In Foods”; Michigan State University Pesticide Loss Prediction Database (http://www.cips.msu.edu/par). 
Table 2: Foreign competition faced by Michigan fruit and vegetable production, 1995-199856





Listed in Rank Order
Apples 7.2 59.6 Fresh: Canada, New Zealand, Chile,
South Africa
Juice: China, Hungary, Germany,
Argentina
Potatoes 5.3 4.6 Canada
Cucumbers 38.6 1.9 Mexico, Canada
Cherries, tart N/A 0.14  Yugoslavia, E.U.
Cherries, sweet N/A 10  Chile (fresh, winter)
Carrots 8.4 1.3 Canada
Tomatoes 31.4 3.5 Mexico, Canada, Netherlands
Asparagus 52.6 22.9 Mexico, China
Corn, sweet 0.8 1.8 Canada
Celery 3.4 N/A Mexico, Canada
Peaches (incl. nectarines) 8.2 N/A Chile, Canada
Beans, snap 1.7 Canada
Grapes 38.2 N/A Fresh: Chile, Mexico, S. Africa, Canada
Juice: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
Spain.
Wine: Italy, France, Chile, Australia,
Spain
Peppers, bell 20.7 N/A Mexico, Netherlands
Strawberries 5.8 N/A Mexico
Cabbage 3.3 1 Canada, Mexico
Cauliflower 3.7 36.9 Mexico
Pears 20.8 N/A Chile, Argentina
Sources: U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, Food Consumption, Prices, and Expenditures, 1970-95; U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic
Research Service, Vegetables and Specialties, Situation and Outlook Yearbook, July 1998; U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, Fruit and Tree Nuts,
Situation and Outlook Report, October 1998; National Association of Beverage Importers, Inc, wine statistics, January - December 1998.57
Appendix A
“At-Risk” Pesticides Used on Michigan Crops by Chemical Class and Trade Name58


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































*   Chemical class of pesticide; OP = Organophosphate
** Pesticide Type: I = Insecticide; N = Nematicide;  O = Other 
Sources: EPA Organophosphate Usage Matrix for North Central Region; Consumers Union identified High-Risk Insecticide Uses; Consumers Union identified Risk-Driver Insecticides; MSU Pesticides At Risk:
http:www.cips.msu.edu/par/MSUPAR98.pdf